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Lesion and functional imaging studies have shown that the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex is critically involved in the avoidance of
risky choices. However, detailed descriptions of the mechanisms
that underlie the establishment of such behaviors remain elusive,
due in part to the spatial and temporal limitations of available
research techniques. We investigated this issue by recording di-
rectly from prefrontal depth electrodes in a rare neurosurgical
patient while he performed the Iowa Gambling Task, and we
concurrently measured behavioral, autonomic, and electrophysio-
logical responses. We found a robust alpha-band component of
event-related potentials that reflected the mismatch between
expected outcomes and actual outcomes in the task, correlating
closely with the reward-related error obtained from a reinforce-
ment learning model of the patient’s choice behavior. The finding
implicates this brain region in the acquisition of choice bias by
means of a continuous updating of expectations about reward and
punishment.
decision-making  emotion
Ventral and medial sectors of the prefrontal cortex (PFC)have been implicated in guiding behavior on the basis of the
motivational value of the choices available (1–3). Damage to this
region in monkeys impairs reversal learning and attenuates
reinforcer devaluation effects (4, 5). Analogous lesions in hu-
mans result in behavior that is guided by the immediate reward-
ing or punishing properties of stimuli rather than by their
prospective future contingencies (6). These findings may also be
broadly related to functions of the adjacent anterior cingulate
cortex in error (conflict) monitoring and response selection
(7–9).
Neural activity within the human ventral and medial PFC is
widely thought to track the incentive value of stimuli rather than
their sensory properties (10–15). Recent studies have found
activation both in expectation of monetary gain or loss (16, 17)
and to prediction errors in appetitive conditioning (18). Whereas
the human data have come from lesion and imaging studies,
studies in monkeys have focused on electrophysiology, with
similar findings (19, 20). Here we combined the rare opportunity
to record directly from the PFC of a neurosurgical patient with
the administration of a widely used, computerized task that
probes decision-making under risk: the Iowa Gambling Task
(21). In addition to the benefit of more direct comparisons
between human and monkey studies, such an approach circum-
vents some of the limitations inherent in noninvasive studies.
Lesion studies are limited with respect to their spatial and
temporal resolution; functional MRI studies using blood oxy-
genation level-dependent imaging have limited temporal reso-
lution and suffer from paramagnetic signal drop-out within
ventral PFC; and scalp event-related potentials (ERP) studies
suffer from poor localization and attenuated signal from more
medial regions.
Patients with damage to the ventral and medial PFC fail to
learn from negative monetary feedback in the Iowa Gambling
Task (22), as they fail in real life to adjust their behavior on the
basis of the mismatch between expectations and choice out-
comes. We thus hypothesized that evoked potentials within the
medial PFC should carry information about the reinforcement
learning that occurs during this task. To obtain a detailed picture
of the relationships between reward contingency, behavior,
emotional response, and electrophysiology, we concurrently
recorded behavioral choice, autonomic response [as measured
by skin conductance response (SCR)], and field potentials from
depth electrodes in a neurosurgical patient undergoing moni-
toring for medically intractable epilepsy.
Methods
Subject. Our participant was a 48-year-old left-handed man with
a diagnosis of medically intractable epilepsy (simple partial
seizures) who had depth electrodes implanted for invasive
monitoring of his epilepsy. There was no evidence on magnetic
resonance scans of any structural abnormality in the PFC, and his
seizure focus was later localized distant from the regions in which
we recorded (in the right premotor cortex). The subject per-
formed normally on background neuropsychological tests of
intelligence quotient (IQ) (total IQ was 110 accessed with the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III), language (left language
dominance was accessed with Wada testing, and he performed
normally on aphasia and naming batteries), verbal and nonverbal
memory (normal performances on the Auditory Verbal Learn-
ing Task, the Benton Visual Recognition Task, the Rey–
Osterrieth Complex Figure Recall, and the Wechsler Memory
Scale), executive function (assessed with the Trailmaking Test),
and visual perception (assessed with the Benton Facial Recog-
nition test). He had no history of psychiatric disease or any
neurological illness other than his epilepsy (see Supporting
Methods, which is published as supporting information on the
PNAS web site).
Iowa Gambling Task. In the standard administration of the Iowa
Gambling Task, we showed our patient four decks of cards (A,
B, C, and D) on a computer monitor and gave him a $2,000 credit
of play money to start. He used a computer mouse to select cards
from the decks in 100 trials. The objective in the task is to make
as much money in the long run as possible. After each choice, the
computer provided two types of feedback before proceeding to
the next trial: first, every deck produced a variable reward;
second, an occasional variable punishment was obtained. Nei-
ther the rewardpunishment contingencies of the cards nor the
total number of trials was known to the subject. The reward was
produced immediately at the time the subject chose a card,
whereas the punishment was produced 3 sec later (Fig. 1); on
trials where no punishment was obtained, a text screen with the
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words ‘‘please wait’’ appeared after 3 sec, thus ensuring that the
period after reward while the subject was waiting for a possible
punishment was the same duration in all trials. A mandatory
intertrial interval (pause) of 6–8 sec was interposed between all
trials (so that it was impossible to pick cards faster than dictated
by this interval constraint).
Two of the decks (the ‘‘safe’’ decks: C and D) feature relatively
lowmonetary gains and occasional low losses with a net gain over
time; the other two decks (the ‘‘risky’’ decks: A and B) feature
larger monetary gains with occasional very large losses and a net
loss over time. The mean initial reward per trial was $107.30
for deck A, $116.90 for deck B, $54.90 for deck C, and $52.50 for
deck D; and the mean subsequent monetary loss was $149.50 for
deck A, $163.30 for deck B, $26.30 for deck C, and $21.20 for
deck D. The probability of obtaining a punishment (the subse-
quent monetary loss) on a given trial was 0.58 for deck A, 0.10
for deck B, 0.59 for deck C, and 0.08 for deck D. The total time
taken by the subject to complete the task was 18.5 min. The
experiments were carried out 5 days after implantation, when
medications had been tapered (see Supporting Methods), and the
subject had recovered from his surgery and was awake and alert.
The subject did not have any seizure at least 12 h preceding the
experiments.
The protocol was approved by the University of Iowa Insti-
tutional Review Board (Iowa City) and the subject’s written
consent was obtained.
Fig. 2. Recording location and ERP response. (a) (Left) Recording sites (indicated by numbers on the figure) were mapped from postimplantation scans onto
the corresponding locations in preimplantation scans (arrows) by using BRAINVOX (44). (Right) The sagittal MRI shows the projection of the most medial recording
site (contact 1) onto the sagittal plane. (b) Averaged ERPs across all trials (n 91 trials after artifact rejection) for each of the recording contacts shown in a (ch1,
channel 1, etc.). Amplitude was linearly rescaled (see Methods). Vertical lines at 0 represent the onset of the feedback given 3 sec after card pick. (c) Averaged
instantaneous amplitude at each recording site. Instantaneous amplitude was calculated from the Hilbert transform of the reconstructed waveform of D5 (alpha)
and D6 (theta) decomposition levels (see Methods). **, P  0.01 increase in amplitude. (d) Phase-locking value (PLV) for each decomposition level at the three
recording sites. Black line, the alpha band; gray line, the theta band; and horizontal thin black lines, P 0.001, assessed with Rayleigh’s test. PLV represents the
degree of phase concentration at particular time points in certain frequency bands across trials.
Fig. 1. Time course of the Iowa Gambling Task. The reward was produced
immediately at the time the subject chose a card, whereas delayed feedback
(either monetary loss or a ‘‘Wait’’ sign indicating an intertrial interval) was
produced 3 sec after the choice. Whereas a minimum intertrial interval of 6–8
sec was interposed, the subject could take as long as he wished to deliberate
the next choice; the resulting median intertrial-interval time was 11.3 sec. The
immediate reward was produced in all trials, whereas the delayed feedback
(punishment) occurred randomly on only some of the trials.
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Electrode Implantation, Localization, and Electroencephalogram Re-
cording. Two hybrid clinical-research depth electrodes (23) were
inserted while the subject was under general anesthesia by using a
CRW stereotactic system (Radionics, Burlington, MA). T1-
weighted structural magnetic resonance scans of the whole brain
were obtained both pre- and post-implantation and permitted
mapping of the location of recording sites seen in the postimplan-
tation scan onto the corresponding location of the preimplantation
scan. Recording site 1 was located in area 10r, the granular
paracingulate cortex, corresponding to the rostral part of monkey
area 10m (24). Recording sites 2 and 3 were located in the right
middle frontal gyrus and area 11l, respectively (Fig. 2a).
Continuous electroencephalogram data were acquired with
bipolar contacts (separation: 200 m, impedance 90–200 k at
1 kHz). Filtered signals (2–6 kHz) were amplified (5,000) and
stored for offline processing. Data were originally sampled at 20
kHz and decimated to 500 Hz, thresholded to discard trials
containing artifacts (nine rejected trials), and normalized so that
their rms values were set to 1.
SCR Recording. Electrodermal activity was continuously recorded
in dc mode from the subject’s nondominant hand by using a
MP-150 system (Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA) and sampled at 10
Hz. Raw waveforms were detrended by using exponential
smoothing, and SCR was calculated as the difference between
the raw signal and the low-frequency tonic trend component
(skin conductance level). Anticipatory SCR and postfeedback
SCR values for each trial were determined, respectively, as
average values of SCR(t) during the 5 sec immediately before
card choice and the 5 sec between 1 and 6 sec after the
punishment or ‘‘wait’’ cue.
Reinforcement Learning Modeling. We modeled the subject’s card
choices with a modified reinforcement learning algorithm (25–
27) that predicts the best choice to be made on the basis of the
statistical distribution of the winning and losing contingencies
experienced on the four card decks. Our modeling of the
subject’s choices incorporated a trial-by-trial update of the action
selection probability (p, the probability of selecting from a
particular card deck), from estimations of parameters that
specify an update value of action values for each possible action
(Q, the value associated with choosing from a particular card
deck), and the degree of exploration or exploitation (26, 27).
This model assumes that the subject maintains expectations for
each of the action values obtained after choosing from one of the
four decks and updates the probability of choosing from a
particular deck on the next trial by comparing action values of all
possible actions at the trial. An indicator of the subject’s learning
in the task is the average value of all of the possible actions
(expected value, V; the mean action values of all four decks
weighted by the probability of choosing from them). We note
that this does not have the same meaning as ‘‘state value’’ in
actor–critic or temporal difference learning schemes as in ref. 25
because we modeled the task as a static action choice. Rather,
it reflects the overall utility of the subject’s prospect, as formu-
lated in prospect theory (28, 29). As with the well-known Delta
and Rescorla–Wagner rules, it is the error in reward (or pun-
ishment) prediction that plays a crucial role in updating the old
estimate (the weights in the model). This error yielded the
subject’s reward prediction error (PE), corresponding to the
difference between expected and obtained reward.
Multiresolution ERP Analysis. Frequency decomposition of the
ERP waveform was used to extract components that overlap in
Fig. 3. Behavioral performance on the Iowa Gambling Task. (a) Card choice from one of the four decks and monetary gainloss as a function of serial order
of the 100 trials (x axis). Red curves, the total amount of money possessed at each trial point; blue and green curves, the amount won and lost, respectively (left
y axis); black diamonds indicate the subject’s choice from one of the decks (right y axis label). (b) The proportion of choices made from the two safe decks (decks
C and D) is plotted over time, in successive 20-trial blocks. The subject learned to avoid risky decks during the task, as is typically observed in healthy subjects (43).
(c) Probabilities for selecting each deck at the trial are plotted as a function of trial number (x axis). Blue, deck A; green, deck B; red, deck C; and magenta, deck
D. The subject correctly learned that decks C and D are advantageous, as represented by larger action selection probabilities, especially in later trials. (d) Blue
line, PE values (left y axis); and red line, expected values (V) (right y axis) as a function of trial number. The trend of expected values increased in addition to
occasional large drops in response to getting large punishments.








time and might otherwise be obscured by averaging. We used a
discrete wavelet transform that yielded six commonly used
frequency-band levels (see Supporting Methods for details): D-1
at 125–250 Hz; D-2 at 62.5–125 Hz; D-3 at 31.3–62.5 Hz; D-4 at
15.6–31.3 Hz; D-5 at 7.8–15.6 Hz; D-6 at 3.9–7.8 Hz; and A-6 at
0–3.9 Hz (D refers to detail, and A refers to approximate). The
D-5 (corresponding to the alpha frequency band) and D-6
(corresponding to the theta frequency band) subband compo-
nents were of special interest because significant phase-locking
across trials and increases in instantaneous amplitude occurred
solely in these decomposition levels. Thus, we further analyzed
responses in these two frequency bands. The time windows for
analysis were chosen on the basis of epochs within which the
largest mean amplitude changes occurred (200–0 msec before
punishment feedback for alpha and 400–0 msec before feedback
for theta; 200–400 msec after feedback for alpha and 200–600
msec after feedback for theta; Fig. 2c). rms values in the time
windows for each frequency band were calculated and used for
statistical assessment.
Results
Behavioral Choice. The subject performed the task as do normal
subjects (21) (Fig. 3a), earning a net sum of money by learning
to avoid decks from which he had previously lost money. The
proportion of the subject’s choices from the two ‘‘safe’’ decks
(decks C and D in Fig. 3a) within the last 50 trials was
significantly higher than that in the first 50 trials ((1)
2  16.3, P
0.001) (Fig. 3b).
Reinforcement Learning Model. Estimates of the parameters we
used in our model were obtained from the subject’s task
performance and showed that the subject performed the task
with a sufficiently large sensitivity to punishment and long
memory for action value updates (see Supporting Methods for
details). The time course of action selection probabilities showed
that the subject learned to discriminate risky from safe decks
(Fig. 3c). The estimated reward prediction error (PE) values and
expected values (V) are plotted in Fig. 3d as a function of trial
number. Large negative PE values were observed in the trials on
which large punishments were given (Fig. 6, which is published
as supporting information on the PNAS web site, shows the
distribution of PE values). Expected values, which represent the
averaged expected reward value obtained on a given trial,
showed an overall slow increase throughout the task, together
with occasional drops in response to obtaining a large punish-
ment. We also found a slow but significant decrease in the
absolute value of the PE over trials (compare with Fig. 7, which
is published as supporting information on the PNAS web site)
reflecting the subject’s learning during the task.
Reward Prediction Error Is Encoded in the Alpha Subband Component.
ERPs were found solely in response to the second (monetary loss
or ‘‘wait’’ cue) feedback. A damped sinusoidal ERP, starting at
170 msec and peaking at 330 msec after this feedback, was
observed from the most medial recording site (contact 1; Fig. 2
a and b). This medial contact showed a statistically significant
increase in rms values when comparing the postfeedback to
prefeedback periods and only in the alpha and theta subbands
(paired t test: P  0.002 for alpha and P  0.003 for theta, n 
91) (Fig. 2c), as these were the two subbands that contained the
most power compared with any of the other bands (see Fig. 8a,
which is published as supporting information on the PNAS web
site). This channel also showed the most significant phase-
locking values (Figs. 2d and Fig. 8b). Other contacts did not show
any significant increase in ERP amplitude in any subband. We
therefore focus the analyses below on signals in the alpha and
theta bands recorded at this location.
We next examined the relationship between the physiological
responses we recorded at contact 1 and the reward PE and other
variables defined by the reinforcement learning model. There
was a weak but significant linear correlation between ERP
amplitude and PE only in the alpha frequency band (Pearson
correlation: r  0.226; P  0.031; n  91) (Fig. 4a). We carried
out a further analysis on only those trials in which the subject had
Fig. 4. Correlations with reinforcement learning parameters. (a) Scatter plot showing correlation between reward prediction error (PE, x axis) and alpha band
rms values (y axis). For all trials n  91, after trial rejection. (b) Scatter plot showing the same correlation as in A, but restricted to trials from risky decks (decks
A and B) on which no punishment occurred (n  21). (c) Scatter plot showing correlation between anticipatory SCR level (5–0 sec before card pick) and action
values for the choices made (x axis) (n  91). Low action values represent risky choices. (d) Difference of average anticipatory SCR level between risky and safe
trials. Error bar represents mean and 1 SEM.
8354  www.pnas.orgcgidoi10.1073pnas.0500899102 Oya et al.
made a choice from one of the risky decks (decks A or B), but
had in fact not been given any punishment (i.e., trials from risky
decks that did not result in any monetary loss; see Fig. 9a, which
is published as supporting information on the PNAS web site, for
data from all trials on the risky decks). For these trials, alpha-
band ERP amplitude was highly correlated with PE values (r 
0.747; P  0.001; n  21) (Fig. 4b), demonstrating that the
correlation is not driven solely by the actual administration of
punishment, but rather by the prediction error associated with it
(expecting such punishment, but not receiving it). Similarly, both
ERP amplitude and phase-locking in the alpha band showed a
striking difference between trials with large PE and trials with
small PE (Fig. 5). By contrast, there was no significant correla-
tion between alpha-band ERP amplitude and punishment mag-
nitude itself (Spearman’s   0.118; P  0.26; n  91), or
reward magnitude itself (  0.076; P  0.47; n  91).
We did not find a correlation between alpha-band ERP
amplitude and PE on trials in which the subject chose from the
safe decks (r 0.035; P 0.78; n 64, see Fig. 9b), showing that
the physiological responses we recorded were not simply driven
by monetary gain in the absence of punishment. Similarly, there
was no significant relationship between monetary gain and
alpha-band ERP amplitude across all trials on which no pun-
ishment occurred (  0.212; P  0.11; n  57). Rather, the
alpha-band ERP appears to encode the subject’s reward PE,
conditional on the risk of the choice taken at the trial.
We further examined the relationship between ERP ampli-
tude and action-values (Q values). Low Q values correspond to
choices that the model discourages, whereas high Q values
correspond to choices that the model would encourage. Action-
values were significantly higher when the subject chose a card
from one of the safe decks than from one of the risky decks [t test:
t(89)  6.20; P  0.001; n  91; see Fig. 10a, which is published
as supporting information on the PNAS web site], thus discrim-
inating the differential risk associated with the decks. We carried
out correlation analyses on those trials in which action values
were 0 (no expected monetary gain), as well as on the trials in
which the action values were 1 (an expected monetary gain).
ERP amplitude and PE were significantly correlated for low
action-value trials (r 0.648; P 0.017; n 13), but not for large
action-value trials (r0.141; P 0.4, n 31; see Fig. 10 b and
c). The majority of low action-value trials consisted of choices
from risky decks (1113  84.6%), whereas large action-value
trials were from safe decks (2731  87%). For more details on
the model see Fig. 11, which is published as supporting infor-
mation on the PNAS web site.
Because SCR in the anticipatory period (5–0 sec before card
pick) predicts whether the choice was from the safe or risky decks
in normal individuals (6), we examined this variable as well. As
expected, we found a significant negative correlation between
anticipatory SCR and the action values of the deck that the
subject was going to pick at the trial (r  0.267; P  0.01; n 
91) (Fig. 4c). There was also a significant difference in antici-
patory SCR between trials of choices from risky and safe decks
(Mann–Whitney: U  555.0; P  0.007; n  91; Fig. 4d),
indicating that SCR in the anticipatory period was larger when
the subject was about to make a risky choice.
Discussion
Judgment under risk and uncertainty is ubiquitous and unavoid-
able in our daily life and has been of considerable interest in
economics and psychology. A number of important aspects of
our decision-making have been revealed, in terms of how we
evaluate gains and losses and how we can be risk-averse or
risk-seeking (28, 29). In real life, relative comparisons are often
more important than absolute values of choice outcomes to
assess the values of an action and to guide advantageous
decision-making. Similarly, prospect theory (30) states that our
decisions are strongly influenced by evaluating changes of values
from a subjective ‘‘reference point’’ rather than their absolute
values, rendering choices susceptible to how they are ‘‘framed’’
(explained) and leading to preference-reversal when the refer-
ence point is shifted. Importantly, we do not weight gains and
losses (seen as changes from some reference point), or low and
high probabilities, in the same way.
We must often predict the outcomes of our choices from our
prior experience. Reinforcement-learning works in this setting,
without a ‘‘teaching signal,’’ to predict the outcome of an action.
The resulting discrepancy between predicted and actual out-
come is coded as the PE, and this biases our future choices. The
present investigation of the underlying neural mechanisms as-
signed an important component of reinforcement learning to
neurons in the medial prefrontal cortex.
Specifically, we found that: (i) reward PE correlated with the
ERP’s alpha band component recorded from medial prefrontal
cortex; (ii) the association between reward PE and alpha-band
ERP was strongly driven by choices that were anticipated to be
risky but violated the expectation of punishment; and (iii)
emotional response (anticipatory SCR) was negatively corre-
lated with action values.
It is important to note that the risky trials in which punishment
was omitted were perceptually indistinguishable from safe trials
Fig. 5. Alpha-band ERPs sorted by PE. (a) Averaged alpha-band amplitude
for trials from risky decks on which no punishment was actually obtained,
divided into two groups according to PE values. Black line, those 50% of trials
with the highest PE values in risky trials followed by no punishment (n 10);
gray line, those 50% of trials with the lowest PE values (n 10); 0 on the x axis
represents onset of the second feedback in the task. *, P  0.001 when
comparing high-PE trials to low-PE trials (mean rms values in the time-window
between 200 and 400 msec after onset of second feedback, Mann–Whitney
test, U  7.00) (b) Phase of alpha-band responses. Trials were divided into
high-PE trials and low-PE trials as above. y axis represents P value of phase-
locking value in log scale. LowP values indicate that phases were concentrated
in a specific direction.








with no punishment. In both cases, the point in time at which a
punishment could have occurred showed the text ‘‘please wait’’
instructing the subject to wait until the next trial. Yet we found
a significant association between PE and alpha-band ERP in the
risky, but not in the safe, case. Similarly, although triggered by
the expectation of possible punishment (i.e., the temporal onset
of the punishment feedback epoch), the ERPs we recorded could
not have encoded actual punishment magnitude because none
was administered on those trials we chose for analysis. We thus
believe that the differences in electrophysiological activity we
found must have been driven by the patient’s expectations rather
than the sensory stimuli presented: namely, the PE arising from
the discrepancy between the two.
In studies that have recorded electroencephalograms at the
scalp, medial PFC including anterior cingulate gyrus has been
thought to be a main generator of ‘‘error-related’’ or ‘‘feedback-
related’’ negativity (31–33) elicited by an incorrect response or
by stimulus feedback that indicates error, respectively. Several
features of our results provide further details to these prior
electrophysiological studies. First, our recording sites were more
ventral than those of the estimated generators of error-related
negativity (31, 32, 34–36). The signals we recorded from closely
spaced, bipolar, high-impedance contacts within the brain pro-
vide better localization because they avoid potential contami-
nation by potentials generated at distant sources. Second, the
ERP alpha-band component we found was sensitive to positive
reward PE, in contrast to some other reports that found greater
sensitivity of scalp-ERP signals for negative PE (37). Third, a
subband component corresponding to the alpha-frequency
range was primarily responsible for encoding this error signal, in
line with some prior findings (38, 39), whereas error-related
negativity may instead be generated by a theta frequency
component (36). Fourth, the responses we found appeared to be
conditioned on the risk of the choice just made. Thus the subject
apparently did not evaluate the reward PE (or values of the
feedback) in the same way throughout the experiment, but
differentially depending on the context, as has been reported in
a prior study of error-related negativity (37).
The present findings implicate the ventro–medial PFC in the
continuous updating of expectations of reward and punishment
based on the reward PE signal that guides the acquisition of
choice bias. The finding is consistent with other recently pub-
lished studies (40, 41) as well as with dopaminergic inputs to this
region of the brain (42). Evaluation of expected reward level
(equivalently, risk of the choice) may thus take place within this
region of the brain, or may be carried out through interaction
with other rewardemotion-related structures to which it is
connected (such as amygdala, basal ganglia, insula, and other
sectors of PFC). It will be important in future studies to begin
to dissect the functional network of which we have here studied
only one component.
We thank J. F. Brugge, H. Damasio, T. W. Buchanan, E. Recknor, O.
Kaufman, and I. O. Volkov for help with the studies, and Natalie
Denburg and Daniel Tranel for help with neuropsychological assess-
ment. This work was supported by grants from the James S. McDonnell
Foundation, the National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and
Depression, and the Gimbel Discovery Fund in Neuroscience.
1. Fuster, J. M. (1989) The Prefrontal Cortex: Anatomy, Physiology, and Neuro-
psychology of the Frontal Lobe (Raven, New York), 2nd Ed.
2. Damasio, A. R. (1994)Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain
(Putnam, New York).
3. Rolls, E. T. (1999) The Brain and Emotion (Oxford Univ. Press, New York).
4. Jones, B. & Mishkin, M. (1972) Exp. Neurol. 36, 362–377.
5. Izquierdo, A., Suda, R. K. & Murray, E. A. (2004) J. Neurosci. 24, 7540–7548.
6. Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D. & Damasio, A. R. (1997) Science 275,
1293–1295.
7. Carter, C. S., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Botvinick, M. M., Noll, D. & Cohen,
J. D. (1998) Science 280, 747–749.
8. Botvinick, M., Nystrom, L. E., Fissell, K., Carter, C. S. & Cohen, J. D. (1999)
Nature 402, 179–181.
9. Kerns, J. G., Cohen, J. D., MacDonald, A. W., III, Cho, R. Y., Stenger, V. A.
& Carter, C. S. (2004) Science 303, 1023–1026.
10. Schultz, W., Tremblay, L. & Hollerman, J. R. (1998) Neuropharmacology 37,
421–429.
11. Schultz, W., Tremblay, L. & Hollerman, J. R. (2000) Cereb. Cortex 10, 272–284.
12. Hikosaka, K. & Watanabe, M. (2000) Cereb. Cortex 10, 263–271.
13. Schoenbaum, G. & Eichenbaum, H. (1995) J. Neurophysiol. 74, 751–762.
14. Gottfried, J. A., O’Doherty, J. & Dolan, R. J. (2002) J. Neurosci. 22,
10829–10837.
15. Small, D. M., Gregory, M. D., Mak, Y. E., Gitelman, D., Mesulam, M. M. &
Parrish, T. (2003) Neuron 39, 701–711.
16. Breiter, H. C., Aharon, I., Kahneman, D., Dale, A. & Shizgal, P. (2001)Neuron
30, 619–639.
17. O’Doherty, J., Kringelbach, M. L., Rolls, E. T., Hornak, J. & Andrews, C.
(2001) Nat. Neurosci. 4, 95–102.
18. O’Doherty, J. P., Dayan, P., Friston, K., Critchley, H. & Dolan, R. J. (2003)
Neuron 38, 329–337.
19. Tremblay, L. & Schultz, W. (2000) J. Neurophysiol. 83, 1864–1876.
20. Roesch, M. R. & Olson, C. R. (2004) Science 304, 307–310.
21. Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H. & Anderson, S. W. (1994) Cognition
50, 7–15.
22. Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D. & Anderson, S. W. (1998) J. Neurosci. 18,
428–437.
23. Howard, M. A., Volkov, I. O., Granner, M. A., Damasio, H. M., Ollendieck,
M. C. & Bakken, H. E. (1996) J. Neurosurg. 84, 129–132.
24. Ongur, D., Ferry, A. T. & Price, J. L. (2003) J. Comp. Neurol. 460, 425–449.
25. O’Doherty, J., Dayan, P., Schultz, J., Deichmann, R., Friston, K. & Dolan, R. J.
(2004) Science 304, 452–454.
26. Sutton, R. S. & Barto, A. G. (1998) Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction
(MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
27. Dayan, P. & Abbott, L. F. (2001) Theoretical Neuroscience: Computational and
Mathematical Modeling of Neural Systems (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
28. Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (2000) Choices, Values, and Frames (Cambridge
Univ. Press, New York, and Russell Sage Foundation, New York).
29. Camerer, C. (1995) in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, eds. Kagel,
J. H. & Roth, A. E. (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton), pp. 587–703.
30. Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979) Econometrica 47, 263–292.
31. Gehring, W. J. & Willoughby, A. R. (2002) Science 295, 2279–2282.
32. Miltner, W. H., Lemke, U., Weiss, T., Holroyd, C., Scheffers, M. K. & Coles,
M. G. (2003) Biol. Psychol. 64, 157–166.
33. Yeung, N., Holroyd, C. B. & Cohen, J. D. (2004) Cereb. Cortex 15, 535–544.
34. Herrmann, M. J., Rommler, J., Ehlis, A. C., Heidrich, A. & Fallgatter, A. J.
(2004) Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 20, 294–299.
35. Nieuwenhuis, S., Yeung, N., Holroyd, C. B., Schurger, A. & Cohen, J. D. (2004)
Cereb. Cortex 14, 741–747.
36. Luu, P., Tucker, D. M. &Makeig, S. (2004) Clin. Neurophysiol. 115, 1821–1835.
37. Holroyd, C. B., Larsen, J. T. & Cohen, J. D. (2004) Psychophysiology 41,
245–253.
38. Schutter, D. J., de Haan, E. H. & van Honk, J. (2004) Neuropsychologia 42,
939–943.
39. Jensen, O., Gelfand, J., Kounios, J. & Lisman, J. E. (2002) Cereb. Cortex 12,
877–882.
40. Ito, S., Stuphorn, V., Brown, J. W. & Schall, J. D. (2003) Science 302, 120–122.
41. Fletcher, P. C., Anderson, J. M., Shanks, D. R., Honey, R., Carpenter, T. A.,
Donovan, T., Papadakis, N. & Bullmore, E. T. (2001) Nat. Neurosci. 4,
1043–1048.
42. Fiorillo, C. D., Tobler, P. N. & Schultz, W. (2003) Science 299, 1898–1902.
43. Bechara, A. & Damasio, H. (2002) Neuropsychologia 40, 1675–1689.
8356  www.pnas.orgcgidoi10.1073pnas.0500899102 Oya et al.
